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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	addresses	the	question	of	which	meta-normative	theories	are	best
supported	by	the	strongest	form	of	motivational	internalism	that	is	pre-theoretically
plausible.	The	first	part	of	the	chapter	is	devoted	to	arguing	that	a	specific	form	of
internalism	satisfies	these	criteria	(of	strength	and	plausibility).	The	remainder	of	the
chapter	focuses	primarily	on	how	the	availability	of	so-called	“hybrid	theories”	in	meta-
normative	theory	makes	answering	the	question,	“which	theories	benefit	most	from	the
truth	of	internalism?”	more	subtle	and	interesting.	The	chapter’s	conclusion	is	that	both
expressivism	(hybrid	and	otherwise)	and	certain	forms	of	hybrid	cognitivism	draw	more
dialectical	dividends	from	the	truth	of	the	form	of	internalism	under	discussion	than	their
rivals.
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So-called	“judgment	internalism”	in	metaethics	and	metanormative	theory	more	generally
comes	in	many	forms.1	What	these	doctrines	all	have	in	common	is	the	assertion	of	some
necessary	connection	between	the	relevant	class	of	judgments	(moral	judgments,
normative	judgments	more	generally,	or	some	proper	subset	of	either)	and	motivation.
The	conventional	wisdom	is	that	the	natural	dialectical	beneficiary	of	the	truth	of
internalism	is	expressivism.	This	is	because	the	expressivist	holds	that	the	relevant
judgments	just	are	motivational	states.	It	is	therefore	very	easy	for	the	expressivist	to
accommodate	even	very	robust	forms	of	internalism.	As	it	is	sometimes	put,	the
expressivist	can	capture	internalism	“for	free,”	whereas	cognitivists	must	tell	some
special	story	either	to	accommodate	internalism	or	explain	it	away.
However,	so-called	hybrid	theories	in	metaethics	and	metanormative	theory	put
interesting	pressure	on	this	conventional	wisdom.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	it	is	in	fact
hybrid	theories,	whether	expressivist	or	cognitivist,	which	are	the	most	natural	dialectical
beneficiaries	of	internalism.	This,	in	turn,	complicates	the	debate	between	expressivists
and	cognitivist	in	interesting	ways,	or	so	I	shall	argue.	I	begin	by	laying	out	a	version	of
internalism	that	I	argue	best	combines	plausibility	and	philosophical	interest	(section	7.1).
I	then	explain	why	the	availability	of	hybrid	theories	puts	pressure	on	the	idea	that
expressivists,	in	particular,	are	the	natural	beneficiaries	of	this	form	of	internalism
(section	7.2).	I	argue	instead	that	it	is	hybrid	theories	in	general	that	draw	most	benefit
from	internalism,	so	understood.	I	conclude	by	considering	what	form	a	cognitivist
theory	would	have	to	take	(p.136)	 to	best	accommodate	the	form	of	internalism	on
which	I	focus,	and	discuss	some	of	the	costs	associated	with	such	forms	of	cognitivism
(section	7.3).	I	conclude	by	discussing	how	this	way	of	thinking	about	the	relevance	of
internalism	promises	to	transform	some	of	the	longstanding	metanormative	debates.
7.1.	“Goldilocks	Internalism”
For	my	thesis	about	the	dialectical	relevance	of	internalism	to	have	maximal	interest,	it	is
important	to	formulate	internalism	correctly.	This	is	not	trivial,	given	the	wide	variety	of
internalist	doctrines	by	now	on	the	market.	In	this	section	I	develop	a	form	of	internalism
that	I	call	“Goldilocks	Internalism,”	simply	to	indicate	my	aim	of	striking	a	certain	sort	of
balance.	In	particular,	I	want	the	form	of	internalism	I	discuss	to	be	weak	enough	to	have
great	plausibility	and	wide	appeal.	On	the	other	hand,	I	want	the	form	of	internalism	I
discuss	to	be	strong	enough	to	be	philosophically	interesting	in	the	first	place.
A	first	question	for	any	internalist	is	just	what	sorts	of	judgments	his	internalist	doctrine	is
about.	Here	I	focus	on	the	practically	normative	rather	than	the	narrowly	moral.	I	take
practically	normative	judgments	to	be	ones	that	play	a	characteristic	and	direct	role	in
settling	the	“thing	to	do.”	Moral	judgments,	like	the	judgment	that	I	have	a	moral
obligation	to	give	to	charity,	will	be	practically	normative	in	this	sense,	but	not	all
practically	normative	judgments	will	be	moral.	Judgments	about	prudential	reasons,	for
example,	are	practically	normative	but	plausibly	are	not	moral.	Perhaps	judgments	about
distinctively	spiritual	and	aesthetic	reasons	for	action	should	also	count	as	practically
normative	but	non-moral.
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Note	that	this	practical/functional	characterization	of	the	practically	normative	need	not
itself	beg	any	questions.	Cognitivists	can	and	have	agreed	that	moral	and	other	normative
judgments	play	a	distinctively	practical	role.	For	example,	Ralph	Wedgwood,	takes	the
practical	role	of	“ought”	to	be	essential	to	its	meaning,	where	this	is	cashed	out	in	the
framework	of	conceptual	role	semantics.	However,	Wedgwood	defends	a	robustly
Platonistic	form	of	realism	on	the	back	of	this	premise	about	the	practical	role	of	“ought”
(see	Wedgwood	2007).	Nor	is	he	all	that	unusual	in	this	regard;	many	cognitivists	would
be	happy	with	some	such	practical/functional	characterization	of	what	I	am	calling
“practically	normative”	judgments.
I	prefer	to	couch	internalism	more	broadly	in	terms	of	the	practically	normative	simply
because	I	take	the	arguments	in	favor	of	internalism,	if	sound,	to	be	equally	plausible	for
non-moral	forms	of	normative	judgments.	Intuitively,	there	is	something	amiss	in
someone	who	judges	that,	all	things	considered,	he	(p.137)	 ought	to	exercise	regularly
but	is	not	motivated	to	do	so	just	as	much	as	there	is	something	amiss	in	someone	who
judges	he	morally	ought	to	give	more	to	charity	but	is	not	motivated	to	do	so.
Which	normative	(I	henceforth	drop	the	“practically”	for	ease	of	exposition)	judgments
should	internalism	be	about,	though?	I	propose	that,	in	the	first	instance	anyway,	the
internalist	should	focus	on	verdicts.	Verdicts	are	naturally	formulated	with	either	“ought”
or	“must”	and	contrast	with	judgments	about	what	would	be	of	some	value,	or	what
there	is	some	reason	to	do.	Plausibly,	I	can	without	practical	irrationality	judge	that	there
is	some	reason	to	stay	in	the	burning	building	(I	can	finish	my	delicious	cake	that	way)
even	though	I	am	not	motivated	in	the	slightest	to	remain	there.	Where	a	reason	is,	by
my	lights,	massively	outweighed,	it	is	not	at	all	obvious	that	I	must	be	motivated	even	in
the	slightest	by	this	reason.	I	therefore	take	the	initial	focus	on	verdicts	to	be	more
promising.
Verdicts	can	be	expressed	either	with	“ought”	or	“must”	and	in	my	view	the	difference
matters.	Plausibly,	“ought”	is	weaker	than	“must”	and	this	remains	true	across	a	wide
range	of	contexts—epistemic	as	well	as	deontic	ones,	for	example.	“He	ought	to	be	there
by	now”	is	weaker	than	“He	must	be	there	by	now,”	where	these	are	used	epistemically.
Similarly,	a	judgment	that	one	morally	must	keep	one’s	promises	is,	in	some	intuitive
sense,	stronger	than	the	judgment	that	one	morally	ought	to	call	one’s	mother	more
often.	In	the	moral	domain,	this	may	reflect	the	fact	that	“must”	is	used	to	introduce	a
moral	obligation,	whereas	“ought”	is	compatible	with	the	action	in	question	merely	being
morally	good	or	virtuous	in	some	way,	but	without	necessarily	thereby	being	morally
obligatory.	The	action	might,	for	example,	be	above	and	beyond	the	call	of	duty.	Although
it	is	less	often	invoked,	I	think	this	distinction	between	“ought”	and	“must”	holds	up	in
other	deontic	contexts.2
With	this	distinction	in	place,	I	propose	that	internalism	is,	in	the	first	instance,	much	more
plausible	for	verdicts	expressed	with	“must”	than	it	is	for	verdicts	expressed	for
“ought.”	Consider	again	the	case	of	supererogation,	for	example.	I	might	judge	that
morally	I	ought	to	give	all	my	money	to	charity	yet	not	be	motivated	to	do	so.	I	might
judge	that	while	I	ought	to	do	this,	I	am	not	morally	obligated	to	do	so.	In	that	case,	it	is
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not	obvious	that	I	am	thereby	irrational,	though	I	am	less	than	fully	virtuous	by	my	own
lights.3
(p.138)	 More	specifically,	I	here	focus	on	the	“all	things	considered	must.”	Judgments
of	this	form	take	into	account	all	the	relevant	reasons,	not	just	(e.g.)	the	moral	reasons.
Such	judgments	also	in	some	sense	have	as	part	of	their	content	the	idea	that	the
relevant	action	is	not	just	best	favored	by	the	balance	of	reasons,	but	that	it	is	a	deontic
requirement.	A	useful	contrast	here	might	be	between	the	judgment	that	there	is	most
reason	for	me	to	eat	more	fruits	and	vegetables	and	the	judgment	that	I	simply	must
refrain	from	consuming	hemlock.
One	nice	thing	about	focusing	on	the	“all	things	considered	must”	is	that	it	provides	some
useful	traction	on	the	so-called	“amoralist”	challenge	to	internalism.	The	amoralist	is	meant
to	be	a	character	who	judges	that	various	actions	are	morally	required,	but	is	simply
unmotivated	to	perform	them.	The	intelligibility	of	the	amoralist	is	meant	to	put	pressure
on	various	forms	of	internalism.	The	move	to	the	“all	things	considered	must”	helps	block
this	objection.	For	the	way	in	which	the	intelligibility	of	the	amoralist	is	made	plausible,
typically,	is	in	terms	of	how	such	a	character	might	take	morality	in	particular	to	be	some
kind	of	a	sham—“for	suckers.”	Think	here	of	Thrasymachus	from	Plato’s	Republic,	or
Hobbes’s	Foole—just	the	sorts	of	characters	invoked	by	those	arguing	for	the
intelligibility	of	the	amoralist.
To	provide	a	direct	challenge	to	internalism	as	I	have	formulated	it,	though,	one	would
need	to	defend	the	intelligibility	of	a	very	different	character,	namely	the	“anormativist.”
The	anormativist	makes	judgments	about	what	she	simply	must	do,	all	things	considered,
but	is	never	motivated	in	the	slightest	by	such	judgments.	Such	a	character	is	much	less
intuitively	coherent,	and	certainly	seems	irrational	in	some	way.	In	any	event,	the
standard	arguments	for	the	intelligibility	of	the	amoralist	will	not	carry	over	neatly	to	the
anormativist.	The	amoralist’s	alleged	intelligibility	might	still	seem	indirectly	relevant,	given
that	moral	judgments	plausibly	are	normative	judgments.	However,	this	more	indirect
challenge	can	be	blocked	in	more	ways.	Perhaps	the	amoralist	admits	that	moral	reasons
are	normative	but	that	they	are	always	outweighed,	for	a	start.
Much	more	interestingly,	though,	insofar	as	one	thinks	the	amoralist	is	really	intelligible,
the	arguments	one	likely	would	give	for	this	view	will	presuppose	that	morality	is	not
really	normative.	So	while	I	agree	that	moral	judgments	are	normative,	there	is	a
dialectical	dilemma	for	the	externalist	here.	On	the	one	hand,	she	needs	moral	judgments
to	be	normative	if	the	amoralist’s	intelligibility	is	to	be	as	much	as	relevant	to	the
intelligibility	of	the	anormativist.	On	the	other	hand,	she	needs	moral	judgments	to	be
non-normative	insofar	as	without	this	assumption	the	arguments	and	intuitions	in	favor	of
the	intelligibility	of	the	amoralist	are	broken-backed.
In	any	event,	for	these	sorts	of	reasons	I	think	my	Goldilocks	Internalism	is	best
formulated	in	terms	of	the	“all	things	considered	must.”	However,	not	all	verdicts
couched	in	terms	of	the	“all	things	considered	must”	are	the	best	candidates	(p.139)
for	an	internalist	treatment.	For	my	judgments	about	what	someone	else	must	do	need
Internalism
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not	motivate	me;	more	weakly,	any	necessary	connection	to	motivation	here	will	be	less
obvious	and	direct.	This	is	most	clear	when	it	comes	to	my	judgments	about	distant
historical	or	fictional	characters.	Perhaps	my	judgment	that	Luke	must	not	kiss	Leia
necessarily	motivates	me	not	to	kiss	Leia	if	in	Luke’s	circumstances	insofar	as	I	am	fully
rational.4	This	sort	of	indirect	necessary	connection	to	motivation	is,	though,	much	more
controversial	than	the	case	of	a	first-person	judgment	couched	in	terms	of	what	I	must
do,	all	things	considered.
Should	the	connection	between	these	judgments	and	motivation	be	qualified	in	some
way?	I	propose	that	the	connection	be	qualified	in	terms	of	the	agent’s	rationality.
Intuitively,	it	is	possible	to	judge	that	I	must	do	something	and	fail	to	be	motivated	to	do
it.	That	this	is	intuitively	possible	is	clear	because	we	take	it	to	be	a	characteristic	sort	of
rational	failing.	Someone	who	fails	to	do	what	they	judge	they	must	is	failing	by	their	own
lights,	and	hence	is	less	than	fully	rational.	Goldilocks	Internalism	therefore	asserts	only
that	the	relevant	verdicts	are	such	that	insofar	as	one	makes	them	one	is	either
motivated	accordingly	or	thereby	irrational.5
What	sort	of	motivation	is	necessarily	connected	with	first-person	judgments	that	one
must	act	in	a	certain	way?	Plausibly,	one	is	rationally	required	to	intend	to	do	what	one
judges	one	must	do	in	this	sense.	Someone	who	simply	had	a	weak	desire	to	do	what	he
deemed	he	must,	but	intended	to	do	the	opposite,	would	thereby	be	irrational.	I
therefore	formulate	Goldilocks	Internalism	in	terms	of	intention	rather	than	in	terms	of
the	weaker	notion	of	having	some	motive,	however	weak,	to	act	accordingly.
Some	theorists	weaken	internalism	by	“going	communal.”	On	these	views,	the	necessary
connection	is	not	between	my	judgment	and	my	motivation,	but	between	my	judgment
and	my	community’s	generally	being	motivated	in	accord	with	such	judgments.6	Although
this	sort	of	internalist	doctrine	might	also	be	plausible,	it	seems	to	me	to	be	too	weak	to
be	as	philosophically	interesting	as	the	more	individualistic	formulation	I	favor	here.	The
point	about	the	rational	pressure	on	individuals	to	intend	in	accordance	with	their
judgments	is	invisible	on	a	communal	form	of	internalism.	Furthermore,	I	suspect	a	sort
of	explanatory	priority	in	favor	of	the	individualist	formulation.	In	particular,	my	hunch	is
that	an	individualist	form	of	internalism,	plus	a	Davidsonian	approach	to	interpretation,
explains	the	truth	of	the	communal	formulation.	However,	I	lack	the	space	to	defend	that
hunch	here.
(p.140)	 Should	the	proposed	necessary	connection	be	understood	as	a	priori	or	a
posteriori?	The	latter	approach	would	be	informed	by	the	model	of	“water	is	H2O”
where	this	is	understood	to	provide	an	empirical	but	necessary	truth.	The	analogous
move	would	be	to	provide	an	empirical	account	of	the	nature	of	the	relevant	judgments,
but	to	argue	that	this	provides	a	necessary	connection	to	motivation.	In	both	cases	the
idea	would	be	to	provide	something	like	an	identity	claim	on	the	basis	of	our	best
empirical	theory	of	the	nature	of	the	stuff	causally	regulating	our	discourse	about	it.	The
more	traditional	approach	to	internalism	is	to	take	the	necessary	connection	it	asserts
between	the	relevant	judgments	and	motivation	to	be	an	a	priori	and	indeed	an	analytic
one.
Internalism
Page 6 of 14
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University of
Edinburgh; date: 18 August 2015
For	present	purposes,	I	propose	to	be	neutral	on	this	point,	as	the	issue	seems	too
controversial	for	a	“Goldilocks”	form	of	internalism	to	decide.	However,	to	put	my	cards
on	the	table,	I	have	some	sympathy	for	the	a	posteriori	approach,	for	the	following
reasons.	The	analytic/synthetic	distinction	is	itself	rightly	controversial,	as	is	the	idea	of	the
synthetic	a	priori.	Normative	judgment	is	also	plausibly	a	natural	kind,	and	if	this	is	so,
then	it	is	a	natural	candidate	for	the	sort	of	semantics	developed	for	other	natural	kind
terms	like	“water,”	and	which	are	used	to	ground	a	posteriori	necessities.	Finally,
construing	internalism	in	this	way	also	provides	more	wiggle	room	on	the	“amoralist”	and
even	the	“anormativist,”	for	internalism	asserts	a	merely	a	posteriori	necessary
connection.	We	can	now	allow	that	such	figures	are	indeed	conceptually	possible,	but	just
not	metaphysically	possible.7
Finally,	should	internalism	be	understood	as	de	dicto	or	de	re—a	useful	distinction
introduced	by	Jon	Tresan	(see	Tresan	2006).	Formally,	the	distinction	is	drawn	in	terms
of	where	the	necessity	operator	goes,	roughly	as	follows:
•	De	Dicto:	Necessarily,	if	x	is	a	normative	belief	then	it	is	accompanied	by	suitable
motivation.
•	De	Re:	Normative	belief	is	necessarily	accompanied	by	suitable	motivation.
(p.141)	 The	basic	idea	is	that	on	a	de	dicto	reading,	what	is	being	asserted	is	a	kind	of
nominal	essence.	We	just	don’t	count	something	as	a	moral	or	normative	judgment
without	the	right	motivational	context.	However,	on	this	approach,	the	very	same
judgment	(where	sameness	is	now	understood	in	terms	of	content)	could	occur	without
the	accompanying	motivation.	It	would	in	that	case	simply	not	be	a	moral	or	normative
judgment.	Whereas	on	a	de	re	reading,	it	is	the	nature	of	the	judgment	itself—its	real
essence—which	essentially	precludes	it	from	occurring	without	the	associated	motivation.
It	is	useful	to	compare	the	necessity	of	planets	orbiting	stars,	which	is	a	de	dicto
necessity.	The	very	same	celestial	object	could	exist	without	orbiting	a	star,	but	it	would
then	not	count	as	a	planet.	Tresan	argues	that	we	should	understand	internalism	in	this
de	dicto	way,	rather	than	de	re.
I,	however,	prefer	the	more	traditional	(if	often	implicit)	de	re	reading.	This	is,	admittedly,
a	stronger	form	of	internalism,	but	I	think	it	provides	a	correspondingly	more	interesting
doctrine.	Insofar	as	the	distinction	matters,	moreover,	the	de	dicto	version	looks
dubious.
First,	plausibly,	normative	beliefs	are	necessarily	normative	beliefs.	The	contrast	with
wishful	thinking	or	inspirational	beliefs	(two	of	Tresan’s	models)	is	striking.	Plausibly,
judgments	are	individuated,	at	least	in	part,	by	what	goes	into	their	“that”	clauses.	Notice
how	weird	the	following	claim	is:	“Yesterday	he	believed	that	eating	meat	is	wrong.
Today,	he	has	that	very	same	belief,	but	he	no	longer	believes	eating	meat	is	wrong.”
Second,	the	de	dicto	reading	does	not	fit	very	well	with	the	form	of	internalism	I	am	after.
For	I	want	to	capture	the	idea	that	failing	to	be	motivated	is	possible,	but	irrational.	To
Internalism
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shoehorn	this	form	of	internalism	into	a	de	dicto	model	would	require	that	we	make	the
relevant	category	not	simply	“such-and-such	normative	belief”	but	rather	“such	and
such	normative	belief	as	held	by	a	fully	rational	agent.”	It	is	simply	implausible	that	such	a
gerrymandered	concept	as	this	has	a	merely	nominal	essence	in	the	way	Tresan’s	de
dicto	internalism	as	adapted	here	would	presuppose.
Here,	then,	at	last,	is	my	proposed	formulation	of	Goldilocks	Internalism:
Necessarily,	for	any	agent	A,	If	A	is	practically	rational	and	makes	a	first	personal
judgment	[that	is,	with	the	indexical	‘I’]	that	A	must	Φ	in	C,	all	things	considered,
then	A’s	judgment	is	necessarily	accompanied	by	an	intention	to	Φ	in	C.8
(p.142)	 I	now	turn	to	the	question	of	what	theories	draw	the	most	natural	dialectical
benefits	from	the	truth	of	Goldilocks	Internalism.
7.2.	Cui	Bono?
The	traditional	view	is	that	expressivism	is	the	natural	dialectical	beneficiary	of	internalism.
This	is	not	surprising,	since	the	practicality	of	normative	judgment	is	often	invoked	as	one
of	the	main	arguments	for	expressivism.	Moreover,	expressivists	do	get	internalism	“for
free”	given	their	theory.	For	if	normative	judgments	just	are	motivating	states,	then
trivially	normative	judgments	will	be	necessarily	associated	with	motivating	states.	By
contrast,	cognitivists	who	want	to	accommodate	internalism	will	need	to	tell	some	fancy
story	about	the	content	or	character	of	normative	judgments	in	order	to	explain	how	a
representational	state	like	a	belief	might	nonetheless	be	necessarily	connected	with
motivation.	Moreover,	those	who	find	a	broadly	Humean	philosophy	of	mind,	according	to
which	(a)	beliefs	and	desires	are	“distinct	existences,”	and	(b)	belief	as	such	is
motivationally	inert,	will	find	it	unlikely,	to	say	the	least,	that	a	cognitivist	could
successfully	accommodate	internalism.
However,	this	traditional	view	is	mistaken.	For	there	are	hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism
which	(a)	are	equally	compatible	with	a	Humean	philosophy	of	mind,	yet	(b)	can
accommodate	internalism	on	the	cheap.	Hybrid	theories	come	in	both	cognitivist	and
expressivist	forms,	but	in	my	view	hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism	and	hybrid	forms	of
expressivism	do	better	in	terms	of	accommodating	internalism	than	their	non-hybrid
cousins.	Let	me	begin	with	a	discussion	of	how	certain	hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism	are	at
least	as	well	placed	as	non-hybrid	forms	of	expressivism	to	accommodate	internalism.
Hybrid	theories	in	metanormative	theory	in	the	sense	invoked	here	hold	at	least	one	of
the	following	theses:
(1)	Normative	claims	express	both	belief-like	and	desire-like	mental	states.
(2)	Normative	judgments	are	either	constituted	by	or	individuated	in	terms	of
both	belief-like	and	desire-like	components.
Hybrid	theories	can	come	in	both	cognitivist	and	expressivist	forms.	I	define	cognitivism
and	expressivism	as	follows:
Internalism
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•	Cognitivism:	For	any	normative	claim	N,	N	expresses	a	[representational]	belief
such	that	N	is	thereby	guaranteed	to	be	true	if	and	only	if	the	belief	is	true,	where	the
content	of	the	belief	expressed	is	the	same	as	the	content	of	the	claim	expressing	it.
(p.143)	 •	Expressivism:
(1)	For	any	normative	claim	N,	N	does	not	express	a	[representational]
belief	such	that	N	is	thereby	guaranteed	to	be	true	if	and	only	if	the	belief
is	true.	(non-cognitivism)
(2)	For	any	normative	claim	N,	N	expresses	a	state	which	is	either	desire-
like	or	necessarily	constituted	in	part	by	a	desire-like	state.
I	have	added	the	clause	“representational”	in	the	definition	of	expressivism	because
expressivists	often	allow	that	there	is	a	deflationist	sense	in	which	normative	judgments
are	beliefs.	However,	in	the	sense	invoked	by	Humean	theories	in	the	philosophy	of
mind,	normative	judgments	are	not,	according	to	the	expressivist,	well	understood	as
beliefs	(qua	representational	states)	with	distinctively	normative	contents.
A	hybrid	form	of	cognitivism	then	adds	to	the	definition	of	cognitivism	proposed	above.
either	the	thesis	that	normative	claims	also	express	desire-like	states	in	some	sense	or
the	thesis	that	normative	judgments	are	partly	constituted	by	or	individuated	in	terms	of
desire-like	states.
Hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism	can	therefore	be	further	divided	in	theoretically	important
ways.	Most	notably,	some	hybrid	cognitivists	allow	a	role	for	desire	only	at	the	level	of
pragmatics.	On	these	views,	normative	sentences	are	semantically	just	like	descriptive
sentences	(apart	from	the	obvious	differences	in	content).	However,	speech-acts	in	which
such	sentences	are	used	to	make	assertions	also	pragmatically	convey	the	speaker’s
desire-like	state(s)	in	some	way.	A	standard	move	here	is	to	appeal	to	the	Gricean	idea	of
“implicature”	and	to	argue	that	normative	claims	implicate	a	speaker’s	relevant	desire-like
states.	Such	implicatures	views	can	be	further	divided	in	terms	of	whether	they	take	the
relevant	implicatures	to	be	conversational	or	conventional.
However,	such	implicature	views	work	only	at	the	level	of	public	language.	Yet	the
internalism	is	a	doctrine	about	normative	thought.	Because	the	relevant	pro-attitudes	are
not	on	these	views	any	part	of	the	judgments	themselves,	nor	rationally	demanded	by
them	(at	least,	not	in	virtue	of	the	pragmatic	story),	they	do	not	accommodate	internalism
by	such	implicatures.	Defenders	of	implicative	views	have	things	to	say	at	this	point,	and
some	of	them	aim	to	debunk	or	explain	away	internalist	intuitions	rather	than	to
accommodate	internalism.	However,	my	aim	here	is	not	to	assess	the	overall	plausibility
of	such	views,	but	simply	to	see	how	far	they	can	go	in	terms	of	explaining	Goldilocks
Internalism.
More	robust	hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism	do	operate	at	the	level	of	normative	thought
rather	than	just	at	the	level	of	public	language.	On	these	accounts,	normative	judgments
are	individuated	in	terms	of	the	presence	of	the	relevant	pro-attitudes.	Someone	simply
does	not	count	as	making	the	relevant	judgment	unless	she	also	is	motivated	in	some	way
Internalism
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specified	by	the	theory.
(p.144)	 Such	“judgment-individuating”	views	can	be	further	divided	according	to
whether	they	take	the	relevant	desire-like	state	to	literally	partly	constitute	the	normative
judgment.	If	they	do,	then	they	hold	a	constitutive	form	of	hybrid	cognitivism.	If	they
don’t,	then	they	hold	a	con-consitutive	but	still	judgment-individuating	form	of	hybrid
cognitivism.	The	latter	view	can	draw	inspiration	from	an	approach	like	Tresan’s,
according	to	which	the	very	same	judgment	can	occur	without	the	motivation	in	question
but	will	then	simply	not	count	as	normative.	On	this	view,	the	motivational	state	in
question	is	not	naturally	thought	of	as	literally	being	part	of	the	judgment,	so	much	as	a
necessary	condition	on	the	judgment’s	counting	as	normative.	Because	this	approach
presupposes	that	internalism	is	analytic,	though,	I	prefer	constitutive	forms	of	judgment-
individuating	hybrid	cognitivism.	Recall	that	I	suggested	in	section	7.1	that	it	is	more
plausible	to	suppose	that	internalism	is	a	posteriori	than	analytic.	However,	not	much
really	hangs	on	this	here.	My	primary	point	is	that	cognitivists	need	to	go	beyond	merely
implicative	views	to	accommodate	Goldilocks	Internalism.	Whether	this	is	best	done	by
adopting	a	constitutive	or	non-constitutive	form	of	judgment-individuating	hybrid
cognitivism	is	not	so	important,	really.
These	views	really	do	look	well	poised	to	accommodate	Goldilocks	Internalism,	though.
They	can	hold	that	for	me	to	count	as	making	a	normative	judgment	of	the	form	“I	must
Φ”	that	I	must	intend	to	perform	actions	of	a	certain	kind	K	and	at	the	same	time	believe
that	my	Φ-ing	would	be	K.	K,	then,	will	provide	the	semantic	content	for	the	“all	things
considered	must,”	but	for	someone	to	count	as	making	a	judgment	of	the	form	“I	must	Φ
in	C,”	it	is	not	enough	that	they	believe	that	their	Φ-ing	in	C	would	be	K.	They	must	also
intend	to	perform	actions	that	are	K.
So	long	as	we	can	help	ourselves	to	the	very	plausible	assumption	that	it	is	practically
irrational	to	intend	to	perform	actions	of	a	given	kind,	believe	that	this	action	would	be	of
that	kind,	yet	fail	to	intend	to	perform	this	action,	a	view	with	this	structure	can
accommodate	Goldilocks	Internalism.	Moreover,	it	accommodates	Goldilocks	Internalism
“on	the	cheap.”	There	is	no	pressure	on	this	sort	of	view	to	abandon	a	Humean
philosophy	of	mind,	or	to	tell	some	special	story	about	normative	judgment	as	a
distinctive	and	sui	generis	yet	unified	mental	state	which	is	at	once	representational	and
motivational.	Rather,	a	role	for	motivation	is	built	into	the	theory	of	the	nature	of	the
relevant	judgments	at	the	ground	level,	and	in	a	way	which	does	not	presuppose	the
falsity	of	Humean	views	in	the	philosophy	of	mind.
So	cognitivists	who	“go	hybrid”	can	steal	the	expressivist’s	thunder	when	it	comes	to	the
motivating	power	of	normative	judgment.	However,	there	is	something	very	even-
handed	here,	in	that	(as	I	have	argued	elsewhere;	see	Ridge	2006)	expressivists	who
“go	hybrid”	can	steal	the	cognitivist’s	thunder	(p.145)	 on	a	number	of	fronts,	perhaps
most	notably	in	terms	of	more	easily	meeting	the	challenge	poised	by	the	notorious
Frege-Geach	problem.	Nor	should	this	be	surprising.	Many	of	the	puzzles	of
metanormative	theory	arise	out	of	the	apparently	Janus-faced	nature	of	normative
judgment.	By	including	both	a	belief-like	and	a	desire-like	component	in	their	theories	at
Internalism
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the	ground	level,	both	expressivists	and	cognitivists	stand	a	better	chance	of	adequately
accommodating	this	Janus-faced	nature.	The	expressivist	does	better	at	accommodating
belief-like	features	by	going	hybrid,	while	the	cognitivist	can	do	better	at	accommodating
the	desire-like	features	of	normative	judgment	by	going	hybrid.
In	fact,	expressivists	can	actually	do	better	when	it	comes	to	accommodating	internalism
by	“going	hybrid.”	In	particular,	they	can	avoid	being	committed	to	a	form	of	internalism
that	is	implausibly	strong,	and	which	precludes	their	offering	a	compelling	account	of
akrasia	by	going	hybrid.	Let	me	explain.
On	Allan	Gibbard’s	preferred	form	of	expressivism,	judging	I	ought	to	(or	must)	Φ	in	C
just	is	planning	to	Φ	in	C.	Trivially,	then,	there	will	be	no	logical	gap	between,	for	example,
judging	that	I	must	Φ	and	my	planning	to	Φ.	Given	that	planning	is	just	a	form	of	intending,
though,	this	means	there	is	no	logical	gap	between	judging	I	must	Φ	in	C	and	intending	to
do	so.	To	return	to	my	Goldilocks	metaphor,	Gibbard’s	internalism	isn’t	“just	right”—it	is
too	strong.	Intuitively,	it	is	possible	to	engage	in	what	is	sometimes	called	“clear	eyed
akrasia,”	in	which	one	knowingly	acts	against	one’s	normative	judgment	while	still	holding
that	judgment.
In	fairness,	Gibbard	owns	up	to	this	implication	of	his	view	and	tries	to	argue	that	it	is	not
so	implausible	as	it	seems.	There	is	a	tradition,	going	back	to	Socrates	in	the	early
dialogues,	of	defending	such	a	strong	connection	between	judgment	and	motivation.	I
lack	the	space	to	discuss	the	various	moves	and	countermoves	here.	Instead,	I	just	want
to	call	attention	to	the	fact	that	this	feature	of	Gibbard’s	view	is	no	accident.	For	insofar	as
one	insists	that	normative	judgment	just	is	a	motivating	state	of	the	right	sort,	one	will	fail
to	be	able	to	make	the	right	kind	of	sense	of	this	specific	form	of	akrasia—akrasia	in	which
one	simply	does	not	form	the	corresponding	intention,	as	opposed	to	akrasia	in	which	one
does	intend	appropriately	but	is	overwhelmed	by	a	stronger	desire,	caves	into
temptation,	and	does	not	follow	through	on	one’s	intention.	Gibbard’s	expressivism	can
accommodate	the	latter	form	of	akrasia	but	not	the	former.
A	hybrid	form	of	expressivism	can	do	better.	On	a	simple	version	of	my	own	view,	which	I
call	“Ecumenical	Expressivism,”	a	normative	judgment	might	be	a	general	plan	to	perform
actions	of	a	given	type	and	a	belief	that	this	action	is	of	that	type.	However,	it	is	well
known	that	one’s	general	intentions	can	fail	to	issue	in	immediate/proximate	intentions.
Clear-eyed	akrasia	(p.146)	 is	possible	on	this	view,	precisely	in	virtue	of	the	gap
between	general	and	specific	motivation.	Moreover,	this	can	also	explain	why	such	akrasia
is	irrational.	For	such	akrasia	will,	on	this	account,	consist	in	a	general	intention	to	do
whatever	actions	have	a	certain	property,	a	belief	that	this	action	has	precisely	that
property,	yet	a	failure	to	intend	to	perform	this	action.	So	Goldilocks	internalism	favors
hybrid	or	“Ecumenical”	Expressivism	if	it	favors	any	kind	of	expressivism	at	all.
So	both	cognitivists	and	expressivists	can	give	a	better	explanation	of	Goldilocks
Internalism	“on	the	cheap”	by	going	hybrid.	In	the	last	and	final	section,	I	explore	what
sorts	of	further	constraints	might	be	imposed	on	a	cognitivist	who	wants	to	“go	hybrid”	in
this	way	in	order	to	explain	Goldilocks	Internalism.
Internalism
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7.3.	What	Form	of	Hybrid	Cognitivism?
I	have	already	argued	that	hybrid	cognitivists	should	favor	some	form	of	“judgment
individuating”	hybrid	cognitivism	to	accommodate	internalism.	In	this	section	I	consider
what	further	constraints	might	plausibly	be	imposed	on	such	a	strategy.	I	do	not	explore
the	analogous	question	for	hybrid	expressivism	simply	because	I	have	developed	my
own	version	of	that	view	in	detail	elsewhere,	and	the	details	of	that	theory	indicate	what	I
take	to	be	some	of	the	most	important	constraints	on	any	such	theory.
One	natural	question	at	this	stage	is	whether	there	are	any	further	constraints	imposed
on	the	content	of	the	“all	things	considered	must”	in	virtue	of	the	sort	of	hybrid
cognitivist	theory	canvassed	in	the	previous	section.	While	no	such	further	constraints
logically	follow	from	the	hybrid	approach,	there	are	some	minimum	constraints	which	are
very	plausible.	Perhaps	most	minimally,	the	content	should	be	such	that	actions	which
satisfy	that	content	are	within	the	agent’s	power.	Otherwise	we	will	have	“must”	without
“can”,	which	seems	dubious.
More	interestingly,	it	may	be	that	non-naturalist	accounts	of	the	normative	do	not	fit	well
with	this	approach.	Indeed,	those	who	have	defended	such	hybrid	theories	in	the
literature	have	all	favored	some	form	of	naturalism,	and	I	do	not	think	this	is	a
coincidence.	Let	me	explain.
Michael	Smith	has	argued,	plausibly	to	my	view,	that	externalist	accounts	of	normative
motivation	make	the	virtuous	and	strong-willed	person	out	as	fetishisizing	rightness.	This
is	because	the	externalist	must	attribute	a	de	dicto	desire	to	do	the	right	thing,	whatever
that	turns	out	to	be.	Otherwise	the	externalist	cannot	explain	why	the	virtuous	and
strong-willed	person’s	motivations	systematically	change	over	time	in	line	with	changes	in
their	judgments.	(p.147)	 Whatever	one	thinks	of	this	argument	(and	it	is	controversial),
anyone	sympathetic	with	ambitious	forms	of	internalism	should	find	it	congenial.	It	is,	after
all,	a	powerful	argument	in	favor	of	internalism.	So	the	dialectic	makes	this	not
unreasonable	to	assume.	Moreover,	it	is	not	all	that	implausible	to	suppose	that	if	the
argument	works	at	all,	it	works	in	the	normative	realm	tout	court	as	well	as	for	narrowly
moral	judgments.	Though	given	that	on	my	view	moral	judgments	are	at	least	a	species	of
normative	judgment,	this	may	not	matter	all	that	much—the	fetishism	argument	can	still
be	deployed	so	long	as	the	hybrid	cognitivist	doesn’t	take	a	different	view	in	the
specifically	moral	case.9
This	has	interesting	consequences	for	the	hybrid	cognitivist	who	wants	to	accommodate
Goldilocks	Internalism,	though.	It	seems	to	suggest	that	anti-reductive	forms	of
cognitivism,	whether	naturalistic	or	non-naturalistic,	will	run	into	problems	if	they	try	to
“go	ecumenical”	to	explain	internalism.	The	problem	for	anti-reductionism:	the	only
content	that	seems	to	ensure	the	right	diachronic	motivational	profile	would	be	something
like	“that	I	do	what	I	must.”	Given	an	anti-reductive	theory,	there	is	no	specific
descriptive	content	for	normative	claims,	after	all.	That,	though,	is	just	the	sort	of	motive
Smith’s	critique	targets.
Of	course,	there	will,	trivially,	be	descriptively	specifiable	truth-conditions	for	normative
Internalism
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claims,	even	given	an	anti-reductive	view.	This	is	trivially	true	in	virtue	of	the
supervenience	of	the	normative	on	the	descriptive.	However,	these	truth-conditions
might	be	massively	complex	and	disjunctive	for	all	that	has	been	said	so	far.	Indeed,	non-
naturalists	often	favor	a	kind	of	radical	pluralism	or	even	“particularism”	on	the	strength
of	their	non-naturalism	(here	think	of	Ross,	historically,	and	Jonathan	Dancy,	more
recently).
Even	if,	as	Moore	thought,	the	descriptive	truth	conditions	are	much	simpler	than	this,
though,	it	would	be	dialectically	odd	to	import	these	truth	conditions	into	a	hybrid	theory
of	what	one	must	desire	to	count	as	making	the	relevant	normative	judgment,	for	anti-
reductive	views	like	Moore’s	are	driven	by	the	so-called	“Open	Question	Argument.”
That	argument	takes	it	that	one’s	normative	stance	is	never	fixed,	simply	qua	conceptual
and	semantic	competence,	by	any	descriptive	take	on	the	world.	To	insist	that	there	is
some	specific	descriptive	content,	such	as	maximizing	happiness,	that	one	must	desire	in
order	to	count	as	making	a	normative	judgment	would	seriously	contradict	the
motivations	underlying	such	anti-reductive	views	in	the	first	place.	Such	a	view	would
hardly	be	attractive.
So	if	one	wants	to	accommodate,	rather	than	reject,	Goldilocks	Internalism	“on	the	cheap”
as	a	cognitivist,	then	one	ought	to	be	a	reductionist	cognitivist.	That	is	in	itself	an
interesting	result,	and	perhaps	casts	interesting	light	(p.148)	 on	the	fact	that	hybrid
cognitivists	in	the	literature	have	without	exception	favored	reductionism.	A	reductionist
cognitivist	can,	of	course,	without	any	awkwardness	of	the	sort	just	discussed	for	the
anti-reductionist,	simply	take	the	descriptive	content	their	theory	assigns	to	the
normative	“must”	and	then	hold	that	one	must	have	a	desire	with	that	content	in	order	to
count	as	making	a	normative	judgment	in	the	first	place.
7.4.	Conclusion
I	have	here	argued	that	both	cognitivists	and	expressivists	can	better	accommodate	what
I	take	to	be	the	most	philosophically	interesting	form	of	internalism	(Goldilocks
Internalism)	on	the	cheap	by	“going	hybrid.”	I	have	further	argued	that	cognitivists	who
take	this	strategy	should	go	for	a	constitutive,	rather	than	an	implicative	form	of	hybrid
theory,	and	that	they	need	to	be	reductionists	about	the	semantic	content	of	normative
predicates.
Since	my	own	view	is	a	form	of	hybrid	or	“Ecumenical”	Expressivism,	one	might	wonder
how	I	think	all	of	this	bears	on	the	larger	debate	between	myself	and	my	cognitivist
hybrid	cousins.	One	point	worth	noting	here	is	that	reductionism	plus	Constitutive
Ecumenical	Cognitivism	makes	the	very	strong	prediction	that	anyone	who	has	ever
made	a	normative	judgment	thereby	has	a	desire	for	some	specific	naturalistic	property
or	state	of	affairs—maximizing	happiness,	or	whatever.	That	simply	seems	implausible	on
its	face.10
In	my	view,	reductionism	also	leads	them	into	trouble	in	terms	of	Moore’s	“Open
Question	Argument”	and	what	I	think	of	as	its	successors—namely	R.	M.	Hare’s	parable
of	the	missionary	and	the	cannibal	and	Horgan	and	Timmons	on	normative/moral	twin
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earth.	These	points	are	not	unrelated,	since	moral	twin	earth	examples	in	effect	get	their
force	from	the	intuition	that	normative	disagreement	is	a	kind	of	fundamental	practical
disagreement	rather	than	some	sort	of	factual	disagreement.	However,	explaining	exactly
how	all	this	bears	on	hybrid	forms	of	cognitivism	is	a	story	for	another	day.11
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Notes:
(1)	Many	thanks	to	Caj	Strandberg	for	detailed	comments	on	a	previous	draft	of	this
material,	and	to	the	participants	of	the	conference	in	Gothenburg	who	also	provided	many
helpful	comments.
(2)	In	work	in	progress,	I	distinguish	“ought”	from	“must”	quite	generally	(and	not	just	in
deontic	contexts)	in	terms	of	a	distinction	between	standards	which	recommend	and
standards	which	require,	where	the	context	determines	the	kind	of	standards	being
invoked.	See	Ridge	(2014).
(3)	The	discussion	of	whether	supererogation	might	bring	other	motivational	or	affective
states	in	its	wake,	as	a	matter	of	necessity,	has	not	been	much	discussed.	One	interesting
candidate	here	might	be	admiration,	or	a	motive	to	praise.	In	his	forthcoming	PhD
dissertation,	Alfred	Archer	discusses	this	issue	in	some	detail.
(4)	Compare	Gibbard	(2003).
(5)	This	is	not	an	uncommon	view;	compare,	e.g.,	Smith	(1994).
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(6)	See,	e.g.,	Tresan	(2006).
(7)	Cf.	Bedke	(2009)	and	Björnsson	(2002)	for	some	discussion	of	how	this	might	go.	My
own	view	is	actually	more	complex	on	this	front.	I	think	that	the	internalist	thesis	I	put
forward	in	the	text	(Goldilocks	Internalism)	actually	can	be	defended	on	a	priori	grounds.
However,	although	I	lack	the	space	to	discuss	this	here,	I	think	that	Goldilocks
Intenralism	can	then	be	used	as	a	premise	in	an	argument	for	another	form	of	internalism
that	can	itself	be	established	partly	on	empirical	grounds.	This	other	form	of	internalism
drops	the	“or	you	are	irrational	clause”	but	weakens	the	connection	to	motivation	to	a
mere	capacity	to	be	motivated	accordingly.	Some	of	the	additional	empirical	facts	needed
to	establish	this	stronger	form	of	internalism	are	empirical	facts	about	the	ubiquity	of
deep	normative	disagreement.	One	useful	framework	here	is	that	both	a	priori
constraints	and	empirical	facts	can	help	us	determine	the	best	theory	of	the	states	that
play	the	role	of	normative	judgments	for	us,	so	that	both	a	priori	and	empirical	facts	can
be	relevant	to	determine	what	realizes	that	role.	I	discuss	these	nuances	more	in	Ridge
(2014).
(8)	Note	that	this	formulation	includes	both	a	wide	scope	and	a	narrow	scope	necessity
operator.	This	reflects	the	fact	that	I	think	de	re	internalism	should	itself	be	understood
as	a	necessary	truth,	if	it	is	true	at	all.	This	marks	a	contrast	with	the	formulation	drawn
from	Tresan	above,	but	one	which	preserves	the	de	re	reading.	The	thesis	would	be	de
dicto	only	if	there	were	no	narrow	scope	necessity	operator	since	that	is	what	ensures
that	the	relevant	judgment	is	necessarily	accompanied	by	motivation	(given	practical
rationality,	on	my	formulation).
(9)	Thanks	to	Caj	Strandberg	for	drawing	me	out	on	this	point.
(10)	Cf.	Mark	Schroeder’s	exchange	with	Daniel	Boisvert,	where	Schroeder	argues	that
insofar	as	this	is	true	it	makes	the	fancy	hybrid	machinery	somewhat	otiose	and
unmotivated	(Schroeder	2009).
(11)	I	try	my	hand	at	it	in	chapter	3	of	Ridge	(2014).
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